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Abstract
The aim of the present paper is to study the relationship between
fiscal variables and the inflation rate for a sample of countries, over
the period 1960-2017, based on a linearized equation derived from a
households ’budget constraint. This equation links the inflation rate
to both fiscal and monetary policy, in addition to the growth rate. We
follow the same approach as Cochrane (2019a) and analyze the impact
of shocks to these three variables. Impacts from fiscal and monetary
policy to the inflation rate are then decomposed between different
monetary policy regimes and fiscal space categories. Results indicate
that the short-term interest rate is the most significant determinant
of inflation. Fiscal policy also affects the inflation rate negatively
through the fiscal balance, but this effect is not robust across all mon-
etary policy frameworks (this relation only holds in unstructured or
loosely structured discretionary monetary policy regimes). The vari-
able of fiscal space on the other hand proves to be an important factor
as inflation appears to be more sensitive to both fiscal and monetary
policy when fiscal space is limited. Finally, we also find that, as pre-
dicted by Sargent & Wallace (1981), fiscal policy can cause inflation
only when the growth rate is lower than the interest rate.
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VAR GMM
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1 Introduction
As public debt has been significantly increasing in the recent decades, en-
suing macroeconomic imbalances, and more particularly the effects on the
price level, have become a source of public concern. Nonetheless, fears of an
inflation outbreak resulting from high indebtedness can only be justified if
the existence of a relationship between inflation and fiscal policy is verified.
In the prevailing literature, inflation is usually linked to monetary policy fac-
tors. For example, the monetarist view suggests that inflation is the result
of too much money chasing too few goods. But this view has been criti-
cized as the relationship between money growth and inflation is not always
empirically verified (e.g. Teles et al. (2016)). In addition, the link between
inflation and the demand for money is becoming more questionable as we
are moving towards electronic transactions and a moneyless economy while
prices remain stable.
Among other factors that are usually considered, we also find monetary
policy. Recent low levels of inflation are indeed thought to be the result of
changing approaches to monetary policy, which, ever since the 1980s, takes
into account a broader range of factors aside from money supply and uses
other instruments in addition to open market operations. The list of nom-
inal anchors has therefore been extended to include exchange rate targets,
inflation targets through the long-run CPI and short-term interest rates on
the short-run (based on the Fisher effect equation). The Taylor rule, as one
method of inflation targeting was found to express accurately the monetary
policy of several economies, even those such as the United States that have
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not officially adopted an IT approach (Clarida et al. (2000)). Still, recently,
this perspective has gotten challenged especially with the long-lasting zero
bound episodes. Furthermore, the difficulty of some central banks to reach
their inflation targets and the inability of many dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models to forecast the recent crisis called into question
their effectiveness to provide efficient policy tools. After the financial cri-
sis, there is a large body of work under way to model financial frictions and
include the zero lower bound (ZLB) within the baseline DSGE framework
(Gust et al. (2017)).
Fiscal determinacy of the price level, on the other hand, has not always
been successfully demonstrated. The first pioneering theoretical contribution
in this respect is Sargent & Wallace (1981). These authors stressed the fact
that governments running persistent deficits should sooner or later have to
finance those deficits through money creation (seigniorage), thus producing
higher inflation. This research paved the way for several works, such as
those on the fiscal theory of monetary policy. Although this theory does
not exclude the impact of monetary variables, it also posits that, if future
surpluses fail to adjust to growing public debt (through more taxes or less
expenditures), then the price level must jump to ensure satisfaction of the
present value government debt equation. Empirical work, however, has had
little success in uncovering a strong and statistically significant connection
between fiscal policy and inflation.
The aim of this paper is to study the link between fiscal variables and the
inflation rate for a sample of 46 countries, over the period 1960-2017, based
on a linearized equation derived from a household’s budget constraint. This
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equation links the inflation rate to both fiscal and monetary policy variables,
in addition to the growth rate. We follow the same approach as Cochrane
(2019a) and analyze the impact of shocks to these three variables. Impact
from fiscal and monetary policy to the inflation rate is then decomposed
between different monetary policy regimes and fiscal space categories.
Results indicate that the short-term interest rate is the most significant
determinant of inflation. Fiscal policy also affects the inflation rate nega-
tively through the fiscal balance, but this relation is not robust across all
monetary policy regimes. The variable of fiscal space also proves to be an
important factor as inflation appears to be more easily affected by both fiscal
and monetary policy when fiscal space is small. Finally, we also find that, as
predicted by Sargent & Wallace (1981), fiscal policy can cause inflation only
when the growth rate is lower than the interest rate.
2 Literature review
2.1 Sargent & Wallace (1981)
The first pionnering contribution that established a link between fiscal policy
and the price level is that of Sargent & Wallace (1981). These authors de-
rived fiscal determinacy of prices from the government intertemporal budget
constraint, expressed as follows:
Gt + it−1Bt−1 = Tt + (Bt −Bt−1) + (Ht −Ht−1) (1)
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with Gt being government expenditures on goods, services, and transfers and
it−1Bt−1 expressing interest payments on the total outstanding debt, Tt the
tax revenues, Bt −Bt−1 new issues of interest-bearing debt.
This equation shows that government expenditures can be funded by
either taxes, new issued debt, or by printing new currency (expressed by the
change in outstanding stock of non-interest bearing debt Ht −Ht−1). Based
on this relation, Sargent & Wallace (1981) provided the following expression
of real government deficits Dt as
Dt = (Ht −Ht−1)/pt + (Bt −Bt−1)/(1 +Rt−1) (2)
with pt the price level at t, and Rt−1 the real interest rate on government
bonds between two periods.
From this relation, they derived an expression of the inflation rate de-
pending on the stock of interest bearing government debt per capita. This
model is based on the assumption that fiscal policy dominates monetary pol-
icy. That is, the fiscal authority independently sets its budget, announcing
current and future deficits and surpluses. And the amount of revenue to raise
is then determined based on those decisions. The monetary authority then
finances with seignorage any discrepancy between the revenue demanded by
the fiscal authority and the amount of bonds that can be sold to the public.
Also, using the assumption that interest rates on bonds are greater than the
economy's growth rate, authors concluded the following: the real stock of
bonds will keep growing faster than the size of the economy. But since the
demand for bonds places an upper limit on the stock of bonds, eventually
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financing of principal and interest will be made through seignorage. In other
words, decisions of the fiscal authority can induce more money printing and
therefore inflation.
2.2 The government debt valuation equation
As a basis of the fiscal determinacy of prices, the following government
debt valuation equation has been suggested by several authors (Sims (1994),
Woodford (1994), Woodford (1995),Woodford (1998)).
Nominal government debt/price level =Expected present value of future pri-
mary surpluses
Or
Bt−1
pt
=
∞∑
j=0
Et (mt,t+jst+j) (3)
with Bt−1= one-period nominal debt issued at t− 1 due at t, pt= price level,
st=real primary government surplus including seignorage, mt,t+j= a discount
factor.
In some cases, this equation has been interpreted as an equilibrium con-
dition resulting from the intertemporal government budget constraint. But
in other contributions, such as Cochrane (1998, 2005), this relation has been
derived as a valuation equation for government bonds seen as securities. The
underlying idea is that nominal debt, including the monetary base, is a claim
to future government primary surpluses (in the same way a stock is a claim
to future earnings). As underlined in Cochrane (2018), bonds prices are de-
termined by the market depending on bond yields and on future streams of
expected primary surpluses.
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2.3 Models of the fiscal theory of monetary policy
In a more recent contribution, Cochrane (2019a) provided a study of the fiscal
roots of inflation based on a linearized identity, showing that unexpected
inflation less the unexpected nominal return on government bonds must equal
the innovation in the sum of futures surplus to GDP less the sum of future
real bond returns. The derived linearized flow identity is as follows
vt + r
n
t+1 − pit+1 − gt+1 = st+1 + vt+1 (4)
vt represents the market value of debt, r
n
t nominal returns on the portfolio
of government debt, pit the inflation rate, gt GDP growth, st real primary
surplus, rnt −pit−gt the discount rate for the right-hand side terms. Variables
are expressed in log terms.
The main results of structural shocks analysis are as follows. The disin-
flation of a recession shock corresponds entirely to a decline in discount rates
leading to higher debt. A positive monetary policy shock (moving interest
rates but not PV of future primary surpluses) is super-Fisherian and raises
inflation immediately. A negative fiscal shock (moving PV of future primary
surpluses but not interest rates) induces a protracted inflation. Quoting the
author’s conclusion (p. 31) regarding effects of a negative shock to primary
surpluses:
A fiscal shock sets off a protracted inflation. Three quarters of
the fiscal shock is transmitted to future inflation via a decline in
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long-term bond prices.
Finally, Sims (2011) suggested a comprehensive theoretical framework,
based on the idea that even in an active fiscal, passive monetary policy equi-
librium, monetary variables still have a powerful effect on both output and
inflation. This model includes assumptions of a long-term public debt, an
interest rate target rising with inflation and output, and fiscal surpluses de-
fined by output (pro-cyclical). Different versions of this model were provided:
a simple flexible-price model of an endowment economy, a model with only
short-term government debt and a new-keynesian style model with long-term
debt and sticky prices. This latter version includes the following equations
(the derivation and solution of this model are provided by Cochrane (2018)):
Monetary policy : r˙ = −γ (r − ρ¯) + θp˙+ ∅c˙+ εm (5)
Fisher∗ : r = ρ+ p˙ (6)
IS∗ : ρ = − λ˙
λ
+ ρ¯+ εr (7)
Government budget constraint : b˙ = −bp˙− ba˙
a
+ ab− τ¯ − τ (8)
Term structure∗ : r = a− a˙
a
(9)
Phillips curve∗ : p¨ = βp˙− δc− εpc (10)
Fiscal policy : τ˙ = wc˙+ ετ (11)
habit∗ : λ = e−σc + ψ (c¨− ρ¯c˙) e−c (12)
r is the nominal interest rate, ρ is the real interest rate, with steady state
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and consumer discount rate ρ¯, p is the log of the price level, c is consumption
which equals output, λ is the marginal utility of consumption, b is the real
market value of government debt (consisting of nominal perpetuities), a is
the consol rate, τ is the primary surplus, τ¯ is a parameter, it represents the
value of τ around which the model was linearized. Starred equations are
forward-looking, which implies that shocks are white noise with no effect.
Based on this framework, the requirement that the real value of debt
matches the present value of future primary surpluses can be met through
jumps in the interest rates which changes the value of outstanding debt even
in the case of sticky prices. Also, the author underlines the fact that effective
monetary measures to reduce inflation lead to a drop of inflation at first and
then produce exactly the opposite effect after a delay. This has been dubbed
“the stepping on a rake“ phenomenon. Evidence was shown through impulse
response functions. On the other hand however, an expansionary fiscal shock
creates a boom in consumption and an upward unanticipated jump in the
inflation rate.
Cochrane (2018) provided the following explanation to reaction of prices
in this model: if the market value of bond prices decreases, following an in-
crease in interest rates for example (due to monetary policy action), without
a change in future surpluses, the price level must adjust. If prices do not
adjust, then the real value of government debt to investors would be greater
than its real market value. People will therefore try to buy more government
debt and thus less goods and services which will lead to lower aggregate de-
mand and thereby lower prices. The same deflationary force would follow
in case of an increase of the present value of real future primary surpluses.
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A more recent trend in the literature establishes a link between the level of
public indebtedness and the fiscal space.
2.4 Public debt and fiscal space
The most widely used definition of fiscal space is the one provided by Heller
(2005) and according to which fiscal space reflects the availability of budgetary
room that allows a government to provide resources for a desired purpose
without any prejudice to the sustainability of a government’s financial posi-
tion. These resources can be accessed through specific fiscal policy measures,
but also through various other channels such as borrowing, seignorage, grants
or institutional reforms. Therefore, the definition of fiscal space is closely
linked to a government’s fiscal sustainability and its potential to expand its
financing capacity. In other words, the availability of fiscal space implies
that a government is able to find resources to finance a desired expenditures
program and to service its debt obligations.
Even though fiscal space refers to the same concept in most macroeco-
nomic policy discussions, concrete measures of fiscal space used in the empir-
ical literature differ significantly across the existing studies. One commonly
used approach is the ’fiscal gap’ approach. It is based on the idea of estimat-
ing the difference between a given level of public debt or the fiscal balance
and a benchmark level considered as the sustainability level (Ostry et al.
(2010), Ghosh et al. (2013))
Debt sustainablity gap = d∗ − dt
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The sustainable debt level d∗ is estimated in different ways. In some
cases, it is considered as the mean level of debt for a given group of countries.
Another approach for estimating d∗ is the signal approach (the debt threshold
that maximizes the ratio of percentage of correctly classified debt crises in
total crises observations divided by the percentage of falsely classified crises
in non-crises observations), suggested by Kaminsky et al. (1998). In some
other cases, a forward-looking approach is used by computing the present
value of future primary balances (International Monetary Fund (2012)), as
in the valuation equation. Such a methodology has been popularized by
Bohn (1998, 2007, 2008). In these studies, fiscal solvency is considered to be
fulfilled when the primary balance reacts positively to an increase in public
debt. This approach derives the relationship between debt and the primary
balance from the intertemporal government budget constraint:
dt+1 − dt = (rt − gt) dt − pst+1
where dt is one-period debt (as a share of GDP) at the end of the period, g is
the growth rate of real GDP which is assumed to be exogenous and constant,
pst is the primary balance (in percent of GDP), and rt is the real interest
rate on debt contracted in period t and due in period (t+1). Based on this
relation, the maximum sustainable level of the primary balance is determined
depending on the different interest rate-growth rate (rt − gt) which differs
across countries.
Some of the criticisms expressed against Bohn’s methodology is that it
does not take into account the endogenous relation between debt and the
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interest rate, and it also does not rule out the possibility of an infinitely
increasing debt. These issues are addressed in the models suggested by Os-
try et al. (2010) and Ghosh et al. (2013) based on which response of the
primary balance to public debt is nonlinear and the interest payment sched-
ule depends on the debt level. In these models, the interest rate becomes
infinite beyond the debt limit as there is no finite rate that would compen-
sate creditors for the probability of default (which becomes equal to unity).
The level of the primary balance reaction function is determined by country-
specific factors (including trade openness, inflation, current and future age
dependency, commodity prices, fiscal instability, presence of fiscal rules, and
international influence on fiscal behavior).
The use of the intertemporal government budget constraint is also found
in contributions such as Buiter (1985), Buiter et al. (1993), Blanchard (1990),
Auerbach & Gale (2011) where an index of fiscal sustainability is derived
based on projections on future balances, also based on the macroeconomic
outlook and forecasts of the discount rate. In addition, using the fiscal gap
approach, some publications by the IMF, such as the Fiscal Monitor, present
a measure of fiscal adjustment by country (inverse of fiscal space), defined as
the distance between the 2011 cyclically adjusted primary balance and that
needed to reduce the general government debt ratio to a sustainable level.1
Finally, Aizenman & Jinjarak (2010) suggested an alternative fiscal space
measure called de facto fiscal space, defined as the inverse of the number of
1Equivalent to 60 percent of GDP in advanced economies and to 40 percent of GDP
in emerging economies and low-income countries by 2030 (or to 2012 levels, if these were
lower than the 60 and 40 percent benchmarks). For Japan, a net debt target of 80 percent
of GDP is assumed.
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tax-years needed to repay the debt. This ratio requires the estimation of the
de facto tax base corresponding to the realized tax collection averaged across
multiple years to smooth for business cycle fluctuations. In Aizenman et al.
(2019), this fiscal space measure is used to examine fiscal cyclicality across a
large sample of countries. Authors find that lower fiscal space coincides with
government-spending procyclicality.
2.5 Empirical literature on the fiscal determinacy of
prices
Results of the existing studies about the fiscal policy-inflation relationship
are mitigated. No conclusive evidence was obtained so far in favor of, nor
against the existence of a fiscal determinacy of the price level. Table 1 sum-
marizes some of these contributions. Some of these studies focused on the link
between fiscal deficits and inflation, while others examined the relationship
between fiscal surpluses and public debt or used a different approach.
For example, Catao & Terrones (2005) examined the existence of a re-
lationship between inflation and fiscal deficits through a study covering 107
countries over 1960 to 2001, based on a dynamic non-linear model, but could
only verify it for the high-inflation, developing economies. Fischer et al.
(2002) also conducted a study on 94 economies, and concluded that fiscal
deficits are the main drivers of high inflation, but only in high-inflation coun-
tries. More specifically, they found out that a reduction in the fiscal balance
by 1 percent of GDP, leads to an increase in the inflation rate by 4.2 percent
in this specific group.
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Bohn (1998) followed a different approach. He examined the U.S. deficit
and debt processes and showed that the primary surplus responds positively
to the debt to GDP ratio. Since evidence was found that the surplus does
adjust, and in a sufficient manner to ensure that the intertemporal govern-
ment budget constraint holds, the author concluded that the fiscal authority
acts in a ricardian fashion. As stated above, this methodology also implies
that a positive adjustment of primary surpluses to public debt indicates the
availability of sufficient fiscal space.
Following Bohn's approach, Bajo-Rubio et al. (2009) used cointegration
analysis between the primary surplus to GDP variable and the public debt
to GDP ratio, complemented with Granger causality tests for a sample of 11
EU countries, over the period 1970-2005. The authors concluded that there
was no clear evidence supporting the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL),
as primary surpluses responded positively to the debt to GDP ratio in almost
all cases. Other studies, such as Canzoneri et al. (2001), Creel & Le Bihan
(2006), reached the same conclusion. Conversely, some others (for example
Favero & Monacelli (2005)) showed the presence of alternated ricardian and
non-ricardian regimes.
There are also empirical studies that led to the validation of the FTPL.
For instance, Loyo (1999) argued that Brazilian policy in the late 1970s and
early 1980s was non-Ricardian and that the FTPL provides a persuasive
explanation for Brazil's high inflation during that time. Tanner & Ramos
(2003) found evidence of fiscal dominance for the case of Brazil for some
important periods. Fan et al. (2013) investigated whether the FTPL can
explain UK inflation in the 1970s. They found evidence that fiscal policy
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was non-Ricardian and money growth entirely endogenous in this period.
Their conclusion was that government expenditures were the only driving
force for inflation and therefore that the 1970s inflation outburst resulted
from an increased level of expenditures, unmatched in the previous decades.
Most of these previous studies used the government’s intertemporal bud-
get constraint as a foundation for the choice of variables. For instance, Bohn
(1998) and Canzoneri et al. (2001) based their verifications on the relation-
ship between public debt and the primary balances, using the assumption
that an adjustment between these two variables would be an indication of
a ricardian regime. In these studies, a regression model between these two
variables served as a basis. However, as pointed out by Bajo-Rubio et al.
(2009), the presence of such a relationship is compatible with both a MD
and a FD regime, since a price increase could be responsible for a fall in the
public debt ratio, indirectly by causing a decrease in the expected value of
future surpluses. To address this issue, the author included Granger causality
tests between primary surpluses and debt, in addition to the cointegration
analysis.
Another way to account for effects of the price level would be using the
government debt valuation equation. This is a more direct way of verifying
the fiscal theory of the price level. However it would be difficult to draw
conclusions based on this method, for many reasons: first, the variable of
the present value of future primary surpluses would be hard to measure and
to analyze.2 Second, the choice of the discount rate would have a significant
2Judgment could be biased by business cycle fluctuations as primary surpluses are likely
to fall during recessions and increase afterwards
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impact on the obtained results. And in addition, as indicated by Cochrane
(2019b), a change in inflation could be the reflection of a change in the dis-
count rate, not a movement in fiscal variables. Finally, another critique to
previous approaches in the empirical literature is that most of them exam-
ined fiscal variables exclusively without taking into account interactions with
monetary policy, in a single model,3 as in Sims (2011). In this respect, the
approach used by Cochrane (2019a) is innovative in the sense that it uses
one single linearized relation to examine links between inflation and both
fiscal and monetary variables, in addition to the business cycle (based on US
data).
In the present paper, we use an approach similar to Cochrane (2019a),
but with a different derivation of the linear relation of inflation, using a
consumer’s budget constraint, and variables expressed in real terms. Also,
as opposed to the methodology used in that study, we do not derive the value
of primary surpluses from the linear identity but instead use actual data to
construct a panel VAR Model. We then examine effects of a fiscal policy
shock, a monetary policy shock and a recessionary shock on our variables,
for a sample of 46 countries over the period 1960-2017. Finally, we further
extend our study by examining how the choice of a monetary policy regime,
and how the level of fiscal space affect the links between our variables.
3In studies related to switching regimes, often two separate models are considered.
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3 Theoretical model
Based on a theoretical framework similar to Woodford (1994), we use the
following consumer’s budget constraint (in nominal terms):
ptct +Bt −Bt−1 = Rt−1Bt−1 + ptyt − Tt (13)
where pt is the price level, ct consumption, Bt the portfolio of assets (as-
sumed to be consisting of government bonds only), Rt the interest rate on
government bonds, yt the household’s income, and Tt the amount of taxes.
This relation states that the sum of consumption and assets purchases is
equal to the sum of interest earnings on assets held from the previous period
in addition to income less tax payment. Assuming that the economy’s global
income yt=gt + ctwith gt being government expenditures, we get
Bt −Bt−1 −Rt−1Bt−1 = Gt − Tt (14)
For a being the % change of the value of debt, we have Bt = (1 + a) Bt−1.
Therefore
Bt−1 (a−Rt−1) = Gt − Tt = −PSt (15)
Because the change in public debt also depends on government bonds yields,
we suppose that the following expression is valid (for a given coefficient k):
a = kRt−1
Therefore
Bt−1 =
PSt
Rt−1 (1− k) (16)
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Rescaling by real GDP yt, and with θt being GDP growth, we have
Bt−1
yt−1θt
=
PSt
ytRt−1 (1− k) (17)
For Byt−1 representing the term Bt−1 rescaled by GDP and PSyt the term
PSt rescaled by GDP, we get
Byt−1 =
θtPSyt
Rt−1 (1− k) (18)
Because the term representing bond yields Rt−1 depends on debt maturity,
if we suppose that there is only one category of bonds with maturity n, the
term structure equation implies that: Rnt = itit+1it+2 . . . it+n−1 (for it the
annualized short term interest rate).
Replacing in Equation (18)
Byt−1 =
θtPSyt∏n
j=t ij
1/n (1− k) (19)
Dividing by pt
Byt−1
pt
=
θt∏n
j=t ij
1/n (1− k)
PSyt
pt
(20)
With the output-adjusted real primary surplus being psyt=
PSyt
pt
and inflation
corresponding to pit =
pt
pt−1
we get
Byt−1
pitpt−1
=
θtpsyt∏n
j=t ij
1/n (1− k) (21)
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Considering that real debt over GDP byt−1=
Byt−1
pt
Then
byt−1
pit
=
θtpsyt∏n
j=t ij
1/n (1− k) (22)
Taking logs
log (byt−1)− log (pit) = log(θt)+log (psyt)− 1
n
log
(
n∏
j=t
ij
)
− log (1− k) (23)
In this equation, the level of inflation appears to be affected by both
fiscal and monetary policy, in addition to growth. As in Cochrane (2019a),
we expect a positive relationship between inflation and public debt, and
a negative relationship with the fiscal balance. According to the author’s
model and empirical findings, higher fiscal deficits should indeed lead to
higher inflation. Also response of inflation to the interest rate is assumed to
be positive, consistent with the neo-Fisherian view and conclusions in Sims
(2011) and Cochrane (2018).
Finally, we expect a negative relationship between inflation and the GDP
growth rate. This result contradicts the conventional view based on the
keynesian and neo-keynesian framework and according to which this relation
should be positive (AD-AS model, Phillips Curve). However, our assumption
is consistent with the findings of several empirical studies and theoretical
frameworks. First, the model developed by Stockman (1981) established
that an increase in the inflation rate results in a lower steady state level of
output, by reducing the purchasing power of money balances, and thereby
the demand for goods and for capital (assuming that a part of investment
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projects is financed through cash). Second, most money and endogenous
growth models concluded that the inflation rate reduces both the return on
capital and the growth rate on the long-run (see Aratawari et al. (2016),
Haslag (1998), Vaona (2012)).
Empirically, several studies revealed an overall negative effect of inflation
on growth, and many of them also detected the presence of a non-linearity
in this relationship. Kormendi & Meguire (1985) was among the first con-
tributions to shift common beliefs about this relationship (from a positive
to a negative one), based on a study using data for 47 countries over the
period 1950-1977. Fischer (1993) found that inflation negatively affects out-
put growth through the channels of investment and productivity growth.
These effects were found to be particularly prominent for a high inflation
rate. De Gregorio (1992) also found a negative relationship between the two
variables, using pooled cross-section time series regressions for a large set of
countries.
Gomme (1993), applied Lucas Jr (1988)’s endogenous growth framework
combined with a cash-in-advance exchange technology. The conclusion of the
paper is that a rise an inflation reduces the marginal value of the last unit of
consumption of a given period. And because this value is equivalent to the
cost of the last unit of work, people are induced to work less. Reduced labor
results in a slower rate of capital accumulation.
Barro et al. (1996) found that a 10 percentage point increase in inflation
results in a 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points reduction in GDP growth (for a
dataset of over 100 countries). This relationship was however obtained only
after high inflation cases were included in the sample (above 20%). Similarly,
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based on a dataset of 145 countries over the period 1960-1996, and using a
multivariate panel regression analysis along with numerous robustness checks,
Ghosh & Phillips (1998) found a negative and statistically significant relation
between inflation and growth. Authors noted that on average, a rise of
inflation from 10% to 20% reduces growth by 0.3%-0.4%, and from 20% to
40% by 0.8%. Finally, Andres & Hernando (1997) found a significant negative
effect of inflation on economic growth. They also found that there exists
a nonlinear relationship. Their main policy message stated that reducing
inflation by 1 percent could raise output by between 0.5 and 2.5 percent.
4 Variables of study and general overview of
data
This study is conducted on a sample of 46 countries (Table 2), for a period
ranging from 1960 to 2017. We use yearly data from several sources for the
variables of study specified in the model.
4.1 Variables of study
Because log (1 + x) ≈ x for small values of x, in some cases, variables were
considered at level:
 Level of Primary Balance/GDP (%): data for primary balances are re-
trieved from the dataset of Mauro et al. (2013). Missing data are com-
pleted from various databases such as the OECD, the World Bank and
the website http://moxlad-staging.herokuapp.com/home/es for Latin
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American economies.
 Log of public debt to GDP: we use the underlying dataset of the paper
Mauro et al. (2013). Missing data are then completed from various
sources such as the website ”tradingeconomics.com” and the Reinhart
& Rogoff (2009) database.
 GDP growth (%): data of GDP per capita are extracted from the World
Bank database
 Short term interest rates: data are collected from several sources, more
specifically from the IFS, Eurostat, the OECD database and in some
cases from central banks’ websites. For very large values, log(1+i) is
used.
 Inflation rate: data are calculated from the Consumer’s Price Index
(with 2010 as the base year), taken from the World Bank database.
Missing data are completed based on the Reinhart & Rogoff (2009)
database. For double-digit values, log(1+inflation) is used instead.
4.2 General overview of data
Yearly evolution of data shows that the level of indebtedness has overall
been increasing over the recent years. By revenue groups (using the IMF
classification), economies affected the most by this increase are advanced
economies (see Figure 1); whereas the most extreme levels are observed for
low-income developing economies in the 1980s (scaled on the right axis).
Both developing and emerging economies have been deleveraging in the recent
21
decade. All sample countries suffered from increasing budget deficits after
the 2007 crisis (Figure 2). But advanced economies have on average been
able to reduce those deficits after 2016.
Inflation levels became very low for all countries after 1995 (see Figure 3,
emerging economies and total average are modeled on right axis). The most
extreme levels have been observed in the 1970s hyperinflation episode, espe-
cially for advanced economies. In emerging economies, the maximum level
of inflation is observed for the year 1990 due to very high values noted for
Argentina, Brazil and Peru. At the same time, public debt to GDP reached
its highest level in the 1980s. However, in the recent decades, the level of
Public debt to GDP is lower than the high peaks of the 1980s or the year
2002 (Argentina’s debt crisis). Regarding developing economies, excessively
high levels of debt accompanied by high inflation were observed in the 1980s;
whereas in the recent years, the levels of both public debt to GDP and infla-
tion are relatively low.
Correlation coefficients between the five main variables of study for the
whole sample is provided in Table 3. The highest coefficient is the correlation
between interest rates and inflation, with a positive sign (+45%). On the
other hand, correlation with the fiscal variables is very weak, negative with
the fiscal balance and positive in the case of public debt. Finally, GDP
growth does not appear to be strongly correlated with any of the variables of
study. The highest coefficient is -17% with the variable of public debt over
GDP.
Using the model described in the previous section, forecast error vari-
ance decomposition of inflation is generated using Cholesky decomposition
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based on an active fiscal policy/passive monetary policy setting. Therefore,
the following ordering of the variables is adopted: the primary balance over
GDP (most exogenous), public debt over GDP, GDP growth, short-term in-
terest rates, Inflation. Results clearly indicate that a significant share of
the forecast error variance of inflation can be explained by exogenous shocks
to the interest rates (between 10% at the beginning and 21% at the end of
the observation period) or past inflation (88% at period 1) (see Figure 4).
The share of shocks to the primary balance, although not null, is very small
(varies between 1.4% and 2.7%). Therefore fiscal policy does affect inflation
but not to the same extent as monetary policy. The impact of public debt
on inflation is almost absent (around 0.6%).
Using the same model to generate forecast error variance decomposition
of public debt (Figure 5), we also do not find evidence of a contribution of
inflation to public debt (limited to 0.5%). Public debt is significantly af-
fected by past debt (around 70%) and a growing contribution of the primary
balance shocks (as expected) (reaching 28.8%), but other variables are in-
significant. Interestingly, the variance decomposition of a one-period lagged
public debt shows a more significant contribution of growth (close to 10% at
the 20th period).
4.3 Monetary policy frameworks
As stated in the introduction, some analysts attribute the generalized low
level of inflation to a major change in monetary policy frameworks. This shift
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in monetary policy thinking by setting up rules or targets (money, credit, ex-
change rate, interest rates, and inflation) aimed at addressing the dynamic
inconsistency issue (Kydland & Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978)). Dynamic in-
consistency refers to changes in the decisions of monetary authorities and the
absence of commitment to a single optimal policy. Especially when output
is below the optimal level, monetary authorities have an incentive in moving
away from an announced target in order to generate a “surprise“ inflation
and thereby a short-term increase in growth. So it is usually based on the
underlying idea that the relationship between inflation and GDP growth is
positive.
A consensus in this literature is that commitment is a better policy be-
cause it generates lower average inflation in the long run (Barro & Gordon
(1983), Rogoff (1985)). The gains from commitment are a direct consequence
of the role that expectations play in shaping economic conditions. More
specifically, Inflation Targeting regimes are thought to have contributed to
reduce inflation levels and increase monetary policy credibility.
To verify this assumption we use the classification provided by Cobham
(2018) for our sample. The author defines a monetary policy framework as
a combination of objectives, constraints and conventions for monetary au-
thorities. Constraints and conventions include “rules or disciplines to which
authorities are subject (voluntarily or involuntarily), the nature of the fi-
nancial and monetary markets and institutions, the understandings of key
macroeconomic relationships, and the political environment“. Among the
criteria used to distinguish between different frameworks is the verification of
whether monetary authorities publish targets for some objective and whether
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such targets exist for monetary aggregates, exchange rates, inflation or other
variables. Based on this definition and other additional criteria, the author
identifies 32 different categories, aggregated into 9 broad categories based on
target variables.
 Direct controls: multiple exchange rates and/or controls on direct lend-
ing, interest rates, etc
 Fixed exchange rates: exchange rate fixed by intervention, some or no
monetary instruments in use or pure currency board (domestic currency
100% backed by foreign currency, no monetary instruments in use)
 Exchange rate target
 Monetary target
 Inflation target
 Mixed targets: monetary targets and exchange rate fixes or targets,
monetary dominant or use of three full targets (or fixes) (money, ER
and IT), whichever dominant
 Unstructured, loosely structured discretion: ineffective set of instru-
ments and incoherent mix of objectives
 Well structured discretion
 No national framework: this category encompasses cases where a dif-
ferent sovereign currency is used (such as dollarization) in addition to
membership in a currency union (euro)
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Some of these categories are not represented in our sample and Cobham
(2018)’s database does not include some of our sample countries (we aggre-
gated them within the ”No national framework” category).
Examining the data (Figure 6), we can see that the IT regime has spread
significantly after the 1990s, while monetary target frameworks disappeared
and exchange rate targets and discretionary regimes became less frequent.
Data shows that levels of inflation are low in all cases in the recent decades.
However, during the 1980s, exceptionally high levels of inflation are noted for
mixed targets regimes (France, Germany and Italy). If there is no fiscal dom-
inance in our sample then the choice of monetary policy frameworks should
affect how inflation reacts to fiscal variables. More specifically, if monetary
policy is the major driver of inflation, we expect that the inflation-fiscal pol-
icy relation will be weakened in commitment monetary policy regimes, and
more particularly inflation targeting.
4.4 Fiscal space
Observing levels of debt alone is not sufficient to draw conclusions about a
government’s solvency. Therefore we introduce the notion of fiscal space in
our analysis to account for a government’s capacity to repay contracted debt.
We use a definition that is closer to that of Aizenman & Jinjarak (2010). We
first calculate the ratio of public debt divided by total government revenues.
This measure reflects the number of years of revenue needed to repay the
outstanding of public debt at a given date. Fiscal space is then defined as
the inverse of that ratio. The most recent available value (2016), the average
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and some descriptive statistics of the calculated measure are given for all
sample countries in Table 4.4
As shown on Figure 7, countries with the lowest fiscal space in the 1980s
are Colombia and Nicaragua. In 2016, Japan has the lowest fiscal space
with the greatest number of years required to repay the debt (see Figure 8).
Simple observation of those two figures does not show an obvious link between
the fiscal balance and fiscal space, since both groups of countries running
substantial budget deficits and those with high surpluses can have either
low or high fiscal space. This implies that fiscal policy does not necessarily
depend on this ratio.
However, correlation coefficients appear to be significant in many coun-
tries (Table 5), even though the correlation sign varies (it is negative in cases
like Japan, Australia, Brazil and the USA, and positive in some other cases,
such as Belgium, Mexico and Pakistan, etc). After the 2007 crisis, the fiscal
space measure has worsened for advanced economies in particular (for exam-
ple Japan, from 3.4 to 6.9 or the USA, from 1.8 to 2.9), reflecting the use
of fiscal stimulus after the recession. On the other hand, emerging and de-
veloping economies, which suffered from a deteriorating fiscal stance during
the 1980s debt crisis, have had a better fiscal space indicator over the last
decade.
4To reduce gaps in data, missing values have been filled using the closest available
values
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5 Results and discussion
We estimate the following VAR model
zt = ∅1zt−1 + . . .+ ∅jzt−j + wt (24)
where
zt =

psyt
byt
θt
it
pit

∅j =

∅j11 ∅j12 ∅j13 ∅j14 ∅j15
∅j21 ∅j22 ∅j23 ∅j24 ∅j25
∅j31 ∅j32 ∅j33 ∅j34 ∅j35
∅j41 ∅j42 ∅j43 ∅j44 ∅j45
∅j51 ∅j52 ∅j53 ∅j54 ∅j55

and wt =

v1t
v2t
v3t
v4t
v5t

The estimation is made using the methodology suggested by Sigmund &
Ferstl (2017) for panel VAR GMM (details provided in Appendices 1 and
2), and after applying forward orthogonal transformation to the variables of
study (see Appendix 3). The methodology of Sigmund & Ferstl (2017) is
useful to eliminate the Nickell Bias (Nickell (1981)), according to which the
correlation between error terms and regressors present in panel VAR OLS
estimations leads to inconsistent estimators. The resulting model is shown
on Table 6).
Results indicate that public debt is persistent with a significant autore-
gressive coefficient. The variables of growth, interest rate and inflation also
have a significant own coefficient. The inflation equation shows that the
only significant variable in determining inflation is the interest rate, with a
positive and high coefficient. Fiscal variables’ coefficients are negative but
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not statistically significant. OLS estimation, on the other hand (Table 7),
shows that both fiscal policy and monetary policy variables significantly af-
fect the variables of study. Also, the primary balance reacts positively to
debt (consistent with our expectations), while debt is affected negatively by
the primary balance (as cumulating budget deficits lead to a growing debt).
The variable of growth has a negative effect on both the fiscal balance and
public debt.
5.1 Inflation’s interdependence with the variables of
study
Using generalized impulse response functions to analyze the impact on infla-
tion of a one-standard deviation innovation in all variables (Figure 9), we note
a positive and very significant response to interest rates (a 1 to 1 response).
A positive shock in the primary balance also induces a positive response of
inflation (higher surplus implies higher inflation), but of a smaller magnitude
(0.3 units). These first results indicate that inflation is affected by both fiscal
and monetary policy. However, response of inflation to public debt is very
small and of a negative sign (less than -0.1 at period 1). Similarly, a shock
to growth also leads to a very limited, negative response of inflation.
On the other hand (see Figure 10), we also observe responses of all vari-
ables to a one-standard deviation innovation in inflation. We note that this
shock induces a positive and very significant response in short-term interest
rates (0.05 units). Public debt to GDP (in log terms) responds negatively
over the long-run (but with a magnitude limited to -0.01). Responses of
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other variables are very small.
5.2 Fiscal policy shock
A one standard deviation positive innovation in the primary balance (Fig-
ure 11) induces a positive but poor response of growth and the interest rates
(less than 0.02 units). This suggests that fiscal policy does not affect mone-
tary policy. On the other hand, a significant and negative response of public
debt over GDP (in log terms) is generated over the long-run (reaching -0.1
at the end of the period). However, response of the inflation rate is the most
notable one. After a positive jump, inflation gets negative immediately in
the second period (which is consistent with findings of the previous subsec-
tion) reaching the value of -0.15. Therefore a policy that increases taxation
or reduces government expenditures would eventually lead to lower future
debt and lower inflation. Similarly, an expansionary fiscal policy induces the
opposite effect as applying a negative shock to the primary balance leads
to a positive jump in the inflation rate, suggesting that fiscal deficits are
inflationary.
Nevertheless, when we split data based on monetary policy frameworks’
classification provided by Cobham (2018)(for the period 1980-2016), we find
that the relationship between inflation and the fiscal balance varies across
monetary policy regimes. First, the correlation coefficients, although not
very high, are very different. The highest level of correlation is +23% in
the case of discretionary regimes (Figure 12). Second, when we decompose
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generalized impulse response functions of inflation to a fiscal shock based on
monetary policy frameworks (Figure 13), we notice that the negative response
of inflation is only seen in unstructured or loosely structured discretionary
regimes (and with a magnitude lower than the response obtained for the
whole sample), while no response is noted for other monetary policy frame-
works. Mixed targets regimes do show a positive response in the long-run,
but due to the small number of observations (3 countries in the 1980s), it is
difficult to draw any conclusions. We find the same result when estimating a
GMM model for inflation based on the different frameworks (Table 8). Inter-
estingly, short-term interest rates do not appear to be statistically significant
in inflation targeting and exchange rate targets regimes.
In the following step of the study, in order to see how fiscal space affects
the relationship between inflation and the fiscal variables, we split our sam-
ple into two fiscal space categories based on the middle quartile. S1 is the
subsample of higher fiscal space countries, for which few years are needed to
repay the debt and S2 is the subsample of economies with lower fiscal space,
for which many years are needed to repay the debt burden. Results (Table 9)
indicate that correlation between inflation and the fiscal balance is positive
with higher correlation for economies with the lowest levels of fiscal space.
Using generalized impulse response functions (Figure 14), a strong posi-
tive (up tp +0.6 units), then negative (to -0.4), response of inflation to a pos-
itive shock to the primary balance is noted for the S2 subsample (economies
with low fiscal space) while in the case of S1, response of inflation is very
weak and positive (+0.2). The implication is that countries with lower levels
of fiscal space are more at risk of inflationary pressures in case of increasing
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deficits. Focusing on the upper and lower 25th quartiles also corroborates
this conclusion, as no response is obtained for the upper quartile (see Fig-
ure 15). Decomposing impulse response functions of S2 (economies with low
fiscal space) by monetary policy regime shows once again that (even for the
isolated case of S2) the relationship between inflation and fiscal policy only
holds for discretionary regimes (Figure 16).
Table 10 shows an estimated regression model of inflation using GMM
(with lagged variables as instruments) and OLS. We can see that for sub-
samples with high fiscal space, the coefficient of the fiscal balance is positive
but not vey high (around 5 in the GMM specification and 1 based on OLS).
In the case of subsamples with low fiscal space, that coefficient is negative,
statistically significant and of a much higher magnitude (-103.8 for the 25th
lower quartile in the GMM model).
Because both discretionary monetary policy regimes and low fiscal space
are factors that determine the existence of a relationship between fiscal policy
and inflation, we plot the number of observations by fiscal space depending
on monetary policy frameworks (Figure 17). Difference between fiscal space
categories in terms of number of observations for discretionary regimes is
not very notable. This implies that discretionary regimes are not necessarily
reflective of cases of low fiscal space. Therefore, both factors are important.
Finally, focusing on the public debt variable, the correlation coefficient of
inflation with public debt (Table 9) is negative in the case of S1 (meaning
that higher debt for countries with enough revenues has a negative effect
on inflation), and positive and significant for S2 (public debt is associated
with high inflation in countries with low fiscal space). Generalized impulse
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response functions show a positive response of inflation to a shock to public
debt(Figure 18 and Figure 19). By fiscal space categories, this relationship
appears to hold only for lower fiscal space countries.
5.3 Monetary policy shock
A positive one SD innovation in short-term interest rates induces a positive
and notable response of the inflation rate, of 0.9 (Figure 20). No response is
obtained for primary balances which implies that monetary policy does not
affect fiscal policy. Response of other variables is very small and negative.
The correlation coefficient between inflation and short-term interest rates is
also positive and very important (as opposed to fiscal policy)(see Figure 21
and Table 9). The most significant values are observed for discretionary
monetary targets and mixed targets regimes.
As in the previous subsection, we decompose generalized impulse response
functions of inflation following monetary policy shocks using the monetary
policy frameworks’ classification (Figure 22). This time, the most significant
responses are those of both discretionary and exchange rate regimes. As in
the previously estimated GMM model (Table 8), response of inflation to the
interest rate is weaker in inflation targeting regimes.
Impulse response functions by categories of fiscal space show that the
response on inflation is stronger in lower fiscal space countries (Figure 23).
The same result is obtained by focusing only on the 25th upper and lower
quartiles (Figure 24). This result is also corroborated by the regression model
discussed previously (Table 10) where coefficient of the interest rate appears
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to be much more significant in the case of countries with lower fiscal space.
5.4 Recessionary shock
In a final step, we apply a -1 unit shock to growth to see the impact of reces-
sionary episode on the variables of study (Figure 25). Response of inflation
(modeled on the right axis) is strong and gets negative in the second period
(to -0.8), but quickly resumes back to its level (consistent with a Phillips
curve as the growth level also adjusts). No response is shown for the pri-
mary balance and the interest rate. Public debt responds positively over the
medium-term (which is consistent with our expectations). Therefore while
the relationship between debt and growth is visible, growth does not ap-
pear to affect the other variables, which confirms findings of the previous
subsections.
The growth rate could however affect the existence of a relationship be-
tween fiscal variables and inflation. As pointed by Sargent & Wallace (1981),
fiscal policy affects the price level when interest rates are greater than the
growth rate, and thereby the cumulating burden of debt gradually surpasses
the demand for bonds by investors. To check this assumption, we split data
between observations where growth is greater than the interest rate and ob-
servations with growth lower than the interest rate (for which we expect to
see a stronger relationship between fiscal policy and inflation). Results (Fig-
ure 26) clearly corroborate this idea as no response from inflation is obtained
in the case where growth is greater than the interest rate.
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5.5 Absence of fiscal dominance
Previous empirical studies, notably Bohn (1998), Bajo-Rubio et al. (2009)
and Canzoneri et al. (2001), rejected fiscal determinacy of the price level and
concluded that governments act in a ricardian fashion because of the presence
of an adjustment of primary surpluses to changes in public debt. We also find
a similar result when we examine the response of fiscal balances to a shock
to public debt. And reciprocally, as in Canzoneri et al. (2001), public debt
reacts negatively to a positive shock to primary balances (Figure 11). Such a
finding is an indication of the absence of fiscal dominance since, as stated by
Tanner & Ramos (2003), the primary surplus adjusts to limit debt growth
when the regime is monetary dominant (MD), so that monetary policy can be
conducted independently of fiscal financing requirements. Moreover, we are
unable to obtain a strong direct relation between public debt and inflation,
when considering the whole sample (see FE variance decomposition of both
debt and inflation in section 4).
However, when examining the relationship between fiscal balances and
inflation, we find a significant negative relationship between both variables
(section 5.2). This result suggests that fiscal deficits are inflationary, as
in Fan et al. (2013). Still, further analysis shows that this relation is not
robust across all sample countries and periods. It only holds in cases when
unstructured or loosely structured discretion is applied. In monetary regimes
based on targets, our results indicate that inflation is not sensitive to fiscal
policy (and is also less sensitive to other shocks).
Such an outcome is not surprising and does not contradict conclusions
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from previous discussions on monetary policy (Kydland & Prescott (1977)
and Barro & Gordon (1983)) according to which inflation’s sensitivity to
shocks is reduced when central banks operate under commitment. The main
justification is that such regimes require independence of monetary author-
ities. Therefore, in these particular cases, governments cannot force central
banks to finance their deficits by generating excess liquidity or pressure cen-
tral banks to keep low interest rates in order to lower governments’ borrowing
costs. In the language of Leeper (1991), fiscal policy is ’passive’ and mone-
tary policy is ’active’, so that there is no fiscal dominance. As a consequence,
we conclude that fiscal determinacy of the price level is only possible when
central banks practice unstructured/loosely structured discretion.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we attempted to verify the presence of a relationship between
fiscal policy and inflation. We used a theoretical and analytical framework
similar to the one suggested by Cochrane (2019a). This approach allowed us
to examine simultaneously the links between inflation, fiscal and monetary
variables, and GDP growth; in contrast to previous empirical studies which
only focused on the relationship between debt and the primary balance, or
between inflation and some fiscal variables.
We followed a slightly different approach than Cochrane (2019a) in de-
riving the linearized identity that served as a basis for our analysis. This
relation was obtained from a household’s budget constraint, using variables
expressed in real terms, as opposed to the government debt valuation equa-
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tion in which the variable of debt alone is expressed in nominal terms. Also,
we did not attempt to compute the value of primary surpluses based on the
linear identity and instead we used actual data to construct a panel VAR
model.
For our sample of 46 countries, over the period 1960-2017, we found a
clear and positive relation between inflation and the interest rate throughout
all steps of the study (GIRF showed a 1 unit response of inflation to a 1 SD
innovation in interest rates). We also found that the inflation rate was neg-
atively affected by the fiscal balance, suggesting that an expansionary fiscal
policy is inflationary. These findings are consistent with those of Cochrane
(2019a). In Cochrane’s study (which covered US data), the relationship be-
tween interest rates and inflation was also found to be strong and positive
and the one between fiscal balances and inflation to be negative.
On the other hand, we could not draw conclusions about the existence
of a direct link between public debt over GDP and inflation. While impulse
response functions showed a positive response of inflation to increasing debt,
this connection did not appear clearly in the variance decomposition analysis.
We also could not find a significant impact from growth to most variables.
Nevertheless, we were able to verify that, as predicted by Sargent & Wallace
(1981), the relationship between fiscal policy and inflation is only present
when growth is lower than the interest rate.
We then further extended our analysis by examining how the choice of
a monetary policy regime, and how the level of fiscal space affect the links
between our variables. Interestingly, we found out that the relationship be-
tween fiscal balances and inflation only holds in cases when unstructured
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or loosely structured discretion is applied. In monetary regimes based on
targets, our results indicated that inflation was not sensitive to fiscal policy
(and was also less sensitive to other shocks). We thereby concluded on the
absence of fiscal dominance. Based on these findings, fiscal determinacy of
the price level is only possible when central banks do not operate under com-
mitment. The most significant implication is that running persistent deficits
will not lead to unexpected higher inflation, if monetary policy is resilient
and credible enough to generate well-anchored inflation expectations.
Finally, we examined how fiscal space (defined as the inverse of the num-
ber of years of revenue needed to repay the outstanding of public debt at
a given date) affects the relationship of inflation with fiscal and monetary
policy. We found that inflation is more sensitive to variations in both the
fiscal balance and the interest rate when fiscal space is low.
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Table 2: Sample countries
Group Countries
Advanced
Australia Austria
Belgium Canada
Denmark Finland
France Germany
Greece Iceland
Ireland Italy
Japan Netherlands
New Zealand Norway
Portugal South Korea
Spain Sweden
Switzerland United Kingdom
United States
Emerging and Middle-income
Argentina Brazil
Chile Colombia
Costa Rica Dominican Republic
India Mexico
Morocco Pakistan
Panama Paraguay
Peru Philippines
South Africa Thailand
Turkey Uruguay
Low-income developing Bolivia Ghana
Haiti Honduras
Nicaragua
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Table 3: Correlation coefficients between main variables
psyt log(byt) pi i θ
psyt 100%
log(byt) -15% 100%
pi -3% 5% 100%
i 4% 1% 45% 100%
θ 15% -17% -1% -1% 100%
Notes: psyt: primary surplus over GDP, log(byt): log of public debt over GDP,
pi: inflation rate, i: short-term interest rate, θ: growth rate of GDP per capita
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Table 4: Inverse of fiscal space ratio (in years): descriptive statistics by
country
2016
Value
Average Min Max
Stand.
Deviation
Number of
observations
Advanced
economies
2.00 1.55 0.25 7.38 1.01 851
Australia 1.13 0.64 0.26 1.13 0.22 37
Austria 1.69 1.31 0.81 1.70 0.21 37
Belgium 2.08 2.23 1.58 2.80 0.35 37
Canada 2.28 1.90 1.18 2.36 0.31 37
Denmark 0.71 0.97 0.50 1.45 0.25 37
Finland 1.16 0.71 0.25 1.16 0.30 37
France 1.82 1.11 0.45 1.82 0.42 37
Germany 1.52 1.29 0.74 1.93 0.32 37
Greece 3.64 2.67 1.04 3.82 0.73 37
Iceland 0.90 1.20 0.55 2.47 0.52 37
Ireland 2.70 2.05 0.67 3.52 0.81 37
Italy 2.80 2.42 1.74 2.84 0.27 37
Japan 7.09 4.33 1.75 7.38 2.02 37
Netherlands 1.41 1.38 0.91 1.68 0.20 37
New Zealand 0.65 0.97 0.40 1.71 0.35 37
Norway 0.65 0.71 0.52 1.04 0.16 37
Portugal 3.01 1.64 0.70 3.01 0.61 37
South Korea 1.11 0.74 0.31 1.13 0.26 37
Spain 2.62 1.35 0.35 2.62 0.60 37
Sweden 0.83 0.92 0.63 1.29 0.18 37
Switzerland 0.84 1.53 0.84 2.18 0.37 37
United Kingdom 2.12 1.44 1.02 2.23 0.37 37
United States 3.22 2.14 1.29 3.30 0.57 37
Emerging
and Middle
-income
2.16 3.16 0.16 236.11 11.32 666
Argentina 1.53 2.33 0.50 8.06 1.46 37
Brazil 1.66 1.49 0.85 2.23 0.36 37
Chile 0.93 1.21 0.16 4.00 1.05 37
Colombia 1.99 12.27 0.61 236.11 46.64 37
Costa Rica 4.25 4.63 1.60 8.88 2.36 37
Dominican
Republic
3.18 3.32 1.19 10.20 2.28 37
India 3.45 2.67 1.36 3.78 0.92 37
Mexico 1.96 2.28 1.50 3.73 0.59 37
Morocco 2.49 3.41 1.45 6.27 1.30 37
Pakistan 4.29 4.97 3.64 6.85 0.77 37
Panama 1.86 2.84 1.57 5.14 0.87 37
Paraguay 1.28 2.38 0.67 5.58 1.47 37
Peru 1.59 2.69 1.04 5.50 1.18 37
Philippines 2.78 3.78 2.23 6.62 0.93 37
South Africa 1.39 1.20 0.78 1.68 0.22 37
Thailand 1.88 1.75 0.21 3.39 0.78 37
Turkey 0.86 1.27 0.72 2.46 0.41 37
Uruguay 1.45 2.31 0.79 5.39 1.15 37
Low-income
developing
2.07 6.51 0.77 53.23 8.44 185
Bolivia 1.31 5.05 0.83 45.89 7.85 37
Ghana 4.25 3.99 1.45 10.12 2.03 37
Haiti 1.81 7.78 0.81 35.02 7.79 37
Honduras 1.18 3.19 0.77 6.76 1.57 37
Nicaragua 1.77 12.56 1.77 53.23 13.02 37
TOTAL 2.07 2.72 0.16 236.11 7.79 1702
Notes: Fiscal space is defined as the sum of total government revenues divided by public debt. The
inverse of this measure reflects the number of years of revenue needed to repay the outstanding of public
debt at a given date 54
Table 5: Correlation coefficient between the fiscal balance and the inverse of
the fiscal space ratio (number of years of revenue needed to repay the debt)
Inverse of fiscal space ratio (years) Correlation coefficient
Countries
1980-2016 1980-2006 2007-2016 1980-2016 1980-2006 2007-2016
Argentina 2.3 2.6 1.6 31% 18% 67%
Australia 0.6 0.6 0.7 -47% -41% -41%
Austria 1.3 1.2 1.5 -47% -51% 16%
Belgium 2.2 2.3 2.0 63% 61% -57%
Bolivia 5.1 6.5 1.0 -71% -73% -8%
Brazil 1.5 1.4 1.7 -65% -64% -10%
Canada 1.9 1.8 2.1 -3% 40% -84%
Chile 1.2 1.5 0.5 15% 8% -71%
Colombia 12.3 16.3 1.4 -1% -3% -87%
Costa Rica 4.6 5.4 2.5 57% 47% -6%
Denmark 1.0 1.1 0.7 29% 10% -90%
Dominican Rep. 3.3 3.7 2.3 26% 25% -48%
Finland 0.7 0.6 0.9 -62% -45% -86%
France 1.1 0.9 1.6 -49% -27% -18%
Germany 1.3 1.2 1.7 -3% -6% -77%
Ghana 4.0 4.5 2.7 10% -6% 28%
Greece 2.7 2.4 3.4 -21% 10% 19%
Haiti 7.8 9.9 2.0 -2% 10% 18%
Honduras 3.2 3.9 1.3 45% 41% -82%
Iceland 1.2 1.0 1.8 -60% -42% -87%
India 2.7 2.4 3.3 35% 56% -56%
Ireland 2.0 1.9 2.6 -37% -12% -24%
Italy 2.4 2.4 2.6 9% 17% -14%
Japan 4.3 3.4 6.9 -84% -75% -92%
Mexico 2.3 2.5 1.8 66% 54% -35%
Morocco 3.4 3.9 2.0 -29% -33% -58%
Netherlands 1.4 1.4 1.4 -11% 19% -79%
New Zealand 1.0 1.1 0.7 -29% -72% -94%
Nicaragua 12.6 16.2 2.8 -1% 19% 74%
Norway 0.7 0.7 0.8 52% 43% 60%
Pakistan 5.0 5.2 4.4 55% 63% -52%
Panama 2.8 3.3 1.7 12% -11% -21%
Paraguay 2.4 2.9 1.0 19% 19% 23%
Peru 2.7 3.2 1.3 -43% -50% -24%
Philippines 3.8 3.9 3.4 22% 13% -58%
Portugal 1.6 1.3 2.5 -42% 3% 9%
South Africa 1.2 1.2 1.1 -10% 4% -88%
South Korea 0.7 0.6 1.0 -63% -49% -73%
Spain 1.4 1.1 2.0 -34% 58% -52%
Sweden 0.9 1.0 0.8 7% 9% -37%
Switzerland 1.5 1.6 1.2 -1% -33% 88%
Thailand 1.7 1.7 2.0 -44% -42% -34%
Turkey 1.3 1.3 1.1 46% 49% -26%
United Kingdom 1.4 1.3 1.9 -69% -15% -64%
United States 2.1 1.8 2.9 -66% -6% -49%
Uruguay 2.3 2.5 1.8 8% 1% 89%
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Table 6: Panel VAR GMM Estimation
psyt log(byt) θ i pi
Lag 1 psyt 8.1820 -1.0367 0.2123 -2.2192 -11.4538
(10.7477) (0.6839) (0.4580) (3.4129) (8.5006)
Lag 1 log(byt) -0.3483 0.9448*** 0.0004 0.1029 -0.1038
(0.4910) (0.0284) (0.0248) (0.1571) (0.1534)
Lag 1 θ -3.3278 -0.0786 0.4696* 0.9481 0.9424
(4.7177) (0.2211) (0.2077) (1.4744) (0.6138)
Lag 1 (i) -0.3201 0.0947 -0.0026 0.8783** 3.8592**
(1.8159) (0.2080) (0.1238) (0.2925) (1.2843)
Lag 1 pi 0.033 -0.0176 0.0027 -0.0005 0.1168*
(0.2301) (0.0277) (0.0152) (0.0319) (0.0501)
Notes: *** p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05
psyt: primary surplus over GDP, log(byt): log public debt/GDP, θ: growth rate,
(i): interest rate, pi: inflation rate.
Forward orthogonal transformation is applied to the variables.
Hansen test of overidentified restrictions: chi2(1375)=35.2, proba >chi2=1
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Table 7: Panel VAR OLS Estimates
psyt log(byt) θ i pi
Lag 1 psyt 0.825 -0.704 0.271 -0.154 -8.726
(71.7) (-7.5) (4.13) (-1.817) (-5.77)
Lag 1 log(byt) -8.6E-05 1.007 0.0013 0.0056 -0.073
(-0.604) (859) (15.4) (5.3) (-3.899)
Lag 1 θ -0.007 -0.408 0.244 -0.0136 0.83
(-2.054) (-14.71) (12.56) (-0.54) (1.85)
Lag 1 (i) -0.001 0.021 0.043 0.848 3.06
(-0.61) (1.567) (4.47) (68) (14.047)
Lag 1 pi 0.00065 0.00056 -0.0013 -0.002 0.136
(4.223) (0.445) (-1.5) (-1.89) (6.7)
Notes: t-statistics in brackets
psyt: primary surplus over GDP, log(byt): log public debt/GDP, θ: growth rate
of GDP per capita, (i): short-term interest rate, pi: inflation rate
R-squared: 0.6797, Adj R-squared: 0.6791
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Table 8: Estimated GMM model for inflation by Monetary Policy framework
Whole
sample
Monet.
Targets
Infl.
Targeting
ERT
Discretion.
regimes
psyt -18.6 0.71 -0.145 10.3 -14.5
0 0.18 0.24 0.76 0.07
log(byt) -0.2 -0.001 -0.002 0.16 -0.24
0 0.82 0.5 0.74 0.013
θ 9.3 0.022 0.62 -10.82 7.5
0 0.92 0.005 0.76 0.38
(i) 4.3 0.72 0.008 -0.97 4.6
0 0 0.907 0.79 0
J-stat (p-value) 0.35 0.02 0.79 0.98 0.37
R-squared 0.10 0.24 -8.49 -804 0.45
Adjusted
R-squared
0.09 0.17 -8.58 -816 0.45
Notes: psyt: primary surplus over GDP, log(byt): log public debt/GDP,θ:
Growth rate of GDP per capita, (i): short-term interest rate, pi: inflation rate
(dependent variable)
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Table 9: Correlation coefficients by fiscal space categories
Correlation S1 S2 Global
Inflation/ fiscal balance 7% 21% 23%
Inflation/ public debt -13% 42% 47%
Inflation/short-term interest rate 90% 71% 76%
Notes: S1: High fiscal space (50th upper percentile); S2: low fiscal space (50th
lower percentile)
Table 10: Estimated inflation regression model by fiscal space categories
Indep.
Var.
GMM estimation OLS estimation
Global S1 S2
25th
up q.
25th
low q.
Global S1 S2
25th
up q.
25th
low q.
psyt -18.6 5.4 -43 4.84 -103.8 -4.55 1.22 -10 1.46 -17.5
(0) (0.04) (0) (0.02) (0) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
log(byt) -0.2 0.08 -0.4 0.04 -1.3 -0.10 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.26
(0) (0.22) (0) (0.58) (0.01) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0.005)
θ 9.3 -11 20.3 -9.7 47.4 -0.27 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 1.23
(0) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.67) (0.57) (0.79) (0.07) (0.6)
(i) 4.3 3.8 5.04 5.23 14.75 4.99 3.9 6.3 4.6 8.03
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
J-stat
(p-val.)
0.35 0.21 0.75 0.28 0.97
R-squ. 0.10 0.13 -0.11 0.29 -0.72 0.21 0.80 0.16 0.85 0.19
Adj.
R-squ.
0.09 0.12 -0.12 0.28 -0.73 0.20 0.80 0.16 0.85 0.18
Notes: (P-value between brackets)
S1: subsample of the upper 50th percentile (High fiscal space); S2: subsample of
the lower 50th percentile (Low fiscal space); 25th up q.:subsample of the upper
25th percentile (Highest fiscal space quartile); 25th low q.:subsample of the
lower 25th percentile (Lowest fiscal space quartile).
Variables psyt: primary surplus over GDP, log(byt): log public debt/GDP,θ:
growth of GDP per capita, (i): short-term interest rate, pi: inflation rate
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Figures
Figure 1: Average Public debt to GDP evolution
(Low-income developing series plotted on the right axis)
Figure 2: Average Primay balance to GDP evolution
(Low-income developing series plotted on the right axis)
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Figure 3: Average Inflation
(Emerging middle-income and Total average series plotted on the right axis)
Figure 4: Variance Decomposition of Inflation using Cholesky (d.f. adjusted)
Factors
psy: primary surplus over GDP, by: log of public debt over GDP, pi: inflation rate, i: short-term interest
rate, θ: growth rate of GDP per capita
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Figure 5: Variance Decomposition of Public Debt Using Cholesky (d.f ad-
justed) Factors
psy: primary surplus over GDP, by: log of public debt over GDP, pi: inflation rate, i: short-term interest
rate, θ: growth rate of GDP per capita
Figure 6: Number of countries by monetary policy framework Cobham (2018)
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Figure 7: Primary balance and fiscal space by country 1980
(Average primary balance plotted on the right axis)
Figure 8: Primary balance and fiscal space by country 2016
(Average primary balance plotted on the right axis)
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Figure 9: Response of inflation to one SD shock to all variables
(Inflation series plotted on the right axis)
Figure 10: Response to one SD innovation in the inflation rate
(Inflation series plotted on the right axis)
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Figure 11: Response to one SD innovation in primary balances
(Inflation series plotted on the right axis)
Figure 12: Correlation coefficient Inflation/Fiscal Balance
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Figure 13: Response of inflation to a positive fiscal policy shock
Figure 14: Response of inflation to a positive fiscal policy shock
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Figure 15: Response of inflation to a positive fiscal policy shock (25th upper
and lower quartile)
Figure 16: Response of inflation to a positive fiscal policy shock for S2 sub-
sample (by MPF)
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Figure 17: Number of observations by fiscal space category and monetary
policy framework
Figure 18: Response of inflation to a positive shock to public debt
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Figure 19: Response of inflation to a positive shock to public debt (25th
upper and lower quartile of fiscal space)
Figure 20: Response to one SD innovation in ST interest rates
(Inflation series plotted on the right axis)
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Figure 21: Correlation coefficient Inflation /Interest Rates
Figure 22: Response of inflation to a monetary policy shock
(Discretionary frameworks series plotted on the right axis)
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Figure 23: Response of inflation to a positive monetary policy shock
Figure 24: Response of inflation to a positive monetary policy shock (25th
upper and lower quartile)
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Figure 25: Response to -1 unit shock to growth
(Inflation series plotted on the right axis)
Figure 26: Response of inflation to a positive fiscal policy shock
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Appendix 1: Panel VAR GMM models (Method-
ology of Sigmund & Ferstl, 2017)
In this paper, we use the methodology provided by Sigmund & Ferstl (2017)for
panel var models. As classical OLS-based regression methods cannot be ap-
plied for panel data models because of the Nickell bias (Nickell (1981)), au-
thors suggested the use of generalized method of moments for panel VAR
models. More specifically, they provided an extension to the work of An-
derson & Hsiao (1982), for the first difference GMM estimator, using lags
of the endogenous variables as instruments (Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and
Arellano & Bond (1991)) and for the system GMM estimator (Blundell &
Bond (1998)).
Sigmund & Ferstl (2017) use the PVAR model of Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988)
and extend it to allow for p lags of m endogenous variables, k predetermined
variables and n strictly exogenous variables, such that:
yi,t = (Im −
∑p
l=1Al)µi +
∑p
l=1Alyi,t−l +Bxi,t + Csi,t + εi,t
with Im an m x m identity matrix, yi,t an m x 1 vector of endogenous variables,
yi,t−lan m x 1 vector of lagged endogenous variables,xi,t a k x 1 vector of
predetermined variables, si,ta n x 1 vector of strictly exogenous variables, εi,t
the idiosyncratic error vector. Al (m x m), B (m x k) and C (m x n) are
parameter matrices. µi is an individual error component representing the
fixed effects.
First, fixed effects are removed by transforming this relation into its first
difference or applying the forward orthogonal transformation (suggested by
Arellano & Bover (1995) to minimize data losses resulting from data gaps).
Based on the first difference representation, the derived first difference GMM
moment conditions are as follows:
E(∆εi,ty
T
i,j)=0 j ∈ {1,. . . , T-2}
E(∆εi,tx
T
i,j)=0 j ∈ {1,. . . , T-1}
E(∆εi,t∆s
T
i,t)=0
Considering that
qTi,t:= (y
T
i,t−p−1, . . . ., y
T
i,1, x
T
i,t−1, . . . , x
T
i,1,∆s
T
i,t)
Then, after stacking the model over time, moment conditions for each i are:
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E[QTi (∆Ei)] = 0
Considered as equivalent to the sample average g(Φ) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 gi(Φ) where:
gi(Φ) = (Qi ⊗ Im×m)(vec(∆Ei))
The number of moment conditions depends on the value of p, m, k and n.
Two solutions are suggested to reduce this number: one is fixing a maximal
lag length after which no further instruments are used, or starting with a dif-
ferent minimal lag. This idea can be applied to lagged endogenous variables
and to predetermined variables. The other is collapsing the instruments such
that the first difference GMM moment conditions become:
E[
∑T−2
j=1 (∆εi,ty
T
i,j]= 0
E[
∑T−1
j=1 (∆εi,tx
T
i,j]= 0
E(∆εi,t∆s
T
i,t)=0
And Qi is reduced to a (T-2) x (T-2) matrix. The GMM estimator is
derived by minimizing the function:
Π(Φ) = (
∑N
i=1 Z
T
i vec(∆Yi − [∆Yi,−1∆Xi∆Si]Φ))TΛ−1Z
(
∑N
i=1 Z
T
i vec(∆Yi − [∆Yi,−1∆Xi∆Si]Φ))
where Φ is defined as [A B C], an m x (p+k+n) matrix of parameters, Zi
is equal to Qi ⊗ Im×m and ΛZ is the GMM weighting matrix. This matrix is
defined, as proposed in the relevant literature through a one-step or a two-
step estimation procedure. In the one-step estimation procedure, it is defined
as in Binder et al. (2005)
ΛZ = [
∑N
i=1Q
T
i DD
TQi]⊗ Im×m
D serves as a (T-1) x T linear transformation matrix such that for any
matrix Vi, DVi=∆V i The two-step estimation uses the residuals of the one-
step estimation as ∆Ei
In addition, Sigmund & Ferstl (2017) address the case of a system GMM
estimator, which is considered to perform better as the first difference GMM
estimator. The additional moment conditions in this case are:
E[εi,t + (I −
∑p
j=1 Aj)µi(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2)T ]= 0 , t ∈ 3, 4, . . . T
E[εi,t + (I −
∑p
j=1 Aj)µi(xi,t − xi,t−1)T ]= 0 , t ∈ 2, 3, . . . T
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E[εi,t + (I −
∑p
j=1Aj)µis
T
i,t]= 0 , t ∈ 2, 3, . . . T
The estimator is then derived similarly as in the previous case. Authors
also provide a framework of structural analysis functions for PVAR models
such as orthogonal and generalized impulse response functions, with a GMM-
specific bootstrap method for estimating confidence intervals, and forecast
error variance decomposition.
Appendix 2: Generalized Impulse Response
Functions
Suppose we have the following standard VAR(2) model:
Zt = θ0 + θZt−1 + εt (25)
With Zt =
[
bt
pt
]
, θ0 =
[
θb0
θp0
]
, θ =
[
θ11 θ12
θ21 θ22
]
and εt =
[
εbt
εpt
]
Backward iteration yields the following expression:
Zt = θ0 + θ(θ0 + θZt−2 + εt−1) + εt
Zt = θ0 + θ × θ0 + θ2Zt−2 + θ × εt−1 + εt
Similarly
Zt = θ0 + θ × θ0 + θ2(θ0 + θZt−3 + εt−2) + θ × εt−1 + εt
Zt = θ0 + θ × θ0 + θ2 × θ0 + θ3Zt−3 + θ2εt−2 + θ × εt−1 + εt
Zt = θ0(1 + θ + θ
2) + θ3Zt−3 + (θ2εt−2 + θ × εt−1 + εt)
More generally:
Zt = θ0(1 + . . .+ θ
n) + θn+1Zt−(n+1) +
∑n
i=0 θ
iεt−i
If the stability condition holds, then An+11 would tend towards 0 as n
approaches infinity. This leads to the MA representation of the VAR model:
Zt = µ+
∑n
i=0 θ
iεt−i
Impulse response functions express the response of one endogenous vari-
able to an impulse in another endogenous variable. Based on the MA repre-
sentation of the VAR model, IRF can be stated as follows:
IRF (k, r) =
∂Zt+k
∂(εt)r
= θker (26)
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Where k is the number of periods after the shock to the r-th component
of and er is a 2x1 vector with 1 in the r-th column and 0 otherwise. In
the VAR model used so far, the disturbances terms are correlated since they
incorporate the contemporaneous effects of all the endogenous variables. The
corresponding structural VAR model can be expressed as follows:[
1 A12
A21 1
] [
bt
pt
]
=
[
φb0
φp0
]
+
[
φ11 φ12
φ21 φ22
] [
bt−1
pt−1
]
+
[
wbt
wpt
]
(27)
Considering that A=
[
1 A12
A21 1
]
, φ0 =
[
φb0
φp0
]
, φ =
[
φ11 φ12
φ21 φ22
]
and
Wt =
[
wbt
wpt
]
Then
AZt = φ0 + φZt−1 +Wt (28)
In this case, Wt is a vector of uncorrelated white-noise disturbances.
Also
Zt = A
−1φ0 + A−1φZt−1 + A−1Wt (29)
Such that:
θ0 = A
−1ϕ0, θ = A−1ϕ and εt = A−1Wt
Thus
εt = A
−1Wt =
[
1 A12
A21 1
]−1 [
wbt
wpt
]
=
[ 1
1−A12A21
−A12
1−A12A21−A21
1−A12A21
1
1−A12A21
] [
wbt
wpt
]
And
εbt =
wbt−A12wpt
1−A12A21
εpt =
−A21wbt+wpt
1−A12A21
It follows that these error terms are composites of the two shocks from
the two variables of the model. Because of this feedback effect, it is dif-
ficult to estimate the structural model. But after estimating the reduced-
form VAR model, it is possible to decompose εt by finding a matrix A
such that εt = A
−1Wt Since the objective is to isolate a disturbances vec-
tor that would have a diagonal variance covariance matrix, one way is us-
ing the Cholesky decomposition on the variance covariance matrix of εt to
find a lower triangular matrix A, such that AA′ = E(εε′) Conversely, the
variance covariance matrix of Wt will be diagonal because and therefore
E(ww′) = AE(′)A′ = ASS ′A′ = AA−1A−1′A′ = I
Using the structural model, we obtain the orthogonal impulse response func-
tion: OIRF (k, r) = ∂Zt+k
∂(Wt)r
= Bker Such that Bk = θ
kA−1 The main limit
of using the Cholesky-decomposition is its dependence on the ordering of
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the variables. To remedy this issue, Pesaran & Shin (1998) suggested an
alternative approach which is the Generalized IRF. They described IR as
the outcome of a conceptual experiment in which the effect over time of a
hypothetical vector of shocks δ hitting the economy at time t is compared
with a base-line profile at time t+k given the economy’s history. Therefore
the disturbances vector comprises both the shocks expected to hit the econ-
omy before t and the vector δ. Formally: GIRF (k, δ,Ωt−1) = E[Zi,t+k|εi,t =
δr,Ωt−1]− E[Zi,t+k|Ωt−1]
With Ωt−1 being the set of available information about economic history at
time t-1. The idea of Pesaran & Shin (1998)approach is choosing to shock
only one element (the r-th element) and integrate the effects of other shocks
using the historically observed distribution of the errors. The Σεbeing the
variance covariance matrix of εt, GIRF are thus expressed as:
GIRF (k, r,Σε) = E[Zi,t+k|εi,t,r = δr,Σε]− E[Zi,t+k|Σε] (30)
As pointed out by Koop et al. (1996), if the vector of random shocks is
considered as jointly normally distributed, then the conditional expectation
of the shocks is a linear function of δ:
E(εtεt,r = δr) = (σ1r, σ2r, . . . , σmr)
′
σ−1rr δr = Σεσ
−1
rr δr (31)
The generalized impulse response of the effect of a shock to the r-th equation
at time t on Zt+k is given by:
θkE(εtεt,r = δr) = (
θkΣε√
σrr
)( δr√
σrr
)
By setting δr =
√
σrr , and considering that σr,r is the r-th diagonal element
of Σε, we obtain the following expression
GIRF (k, r,Σε) = θ
kΣε(σr,r)
−1/2 (32)
Appendix 3: Forward Orthogonal Transforma-
tion
The forward orthogonal transformation was suggested by Arellano & Bover
(1995) to minimize data losses due to data gaps. Based on the following VAR
model
yi,t =
p∑
l=1
Alyi,t−l +Bxi,t + Csi,t + i,t (33)
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When the first difference transformation is used, we get
∆yi,t =
p∑
l=1
Al∆yi,t−l +B∆xi,t + C∆si,t + ∆i,t (34)
When forward orthogonal transformation is applied, variables are replaced
by the following expression
yLi,t+1 = ci,t
(
yi,t − 1/Ti,t
∑
s>t
yi,s
)
(35)
Where ci,t =
√
Ti,t/Ti,t + 1
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